

## End of Award Report

### Social Human Rights Impacts and the Governance of Technology

#### 1. Background

Assessments of social and human rights impacts are playing an increasingly important role in the governance of technology. Following the adoption of World Bank guidelines, formal assessments of such matters as resettlement, conflict prevention, corruption and the preservation of cultural heritage have become an established part of the process of financing international technological development projects. This study focused on controversies concerning the social and human rights impacts of two major technological development projects: the Ilusu Dam and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. For the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and BP, the major partner in the BTC project, the pipeline has become a key test in the development of new practices of transparency, social responsibility, and public consultation. The project was heavily criticized by both international and local NGOs, including Friends of the Earth and CEE Bankwatch, and the World Wild Life Fund.

#### 2. Objectives

All objectives were met.

*2.1 Through two significant case studies, to analyse how international guidelines on social and human rights impact assessment of technological development projects are implemented in practice.*

The study identified a number of key difficulties in the implementation of international guidelines including significant problems in implementing transparency (4.2) and weaknesses in the conduct of social impact assessment research (4.4). The question of whether international guidelines were properly implemented was central to the BTC controversy.

*2.2 To analyse how government and international financial institutions adjudicate between alternative assessments of social and human rights impacts.*

The study demonstrates the reliance of national governments on companies and IFIs for accounts of social and human rights impacts (4.6). However, the research also found that expertise in social impact assessment is underdeveloped in all institutions. Significant issues were highlighted by NGOs, but NGO claims lacked credibility in government and the IFIs (4.4.4).

*2.3 To examine how different interested publics figure in such assessments and to what extent the assessments are accountable to them.*

The study shows that interested publics were very poorly represented during the development of the Ilusu dam project. In the case of BTC, interested publics figured as: stakeholders who should be consulted; individual and villages who needed to be compensated; and affected communities. Despite extensive consultation, the collective concerns and interests of affected communities were poorly represented by national governments and unevenly represented by both international and local NGOs (4.6).

*2.4 Given the plurality of sources of expertise and knowledge, to analyse how we can*

*understand the network of relations between government, parliament, companies, financial institutions and NGOs. To examine to what extent companies and financial institutions draw upon the expertise and knowledge of NGOs and enter into dialogue with NGOs, or whether the relationship is primarily an antagonistic one.*

The relation between companies and financial institutions and NGOs is complex given the diversity of forms of NGO involved. However, in the case of both Ilusu and BTC, the dominant relationship between companies and IFIs, on the one hand, and international NGOs, on the other, was an antagonistic one. In these circumstances, there was little constructive dialogue between NGO campaigners and financial institutions regarding problematic issues such as compensation (4.5) and the control of subcontractors (4.6).

*2.5 Through case studies, to contribute to new sociological theories of the relations between social scientific expertise, technology, economy and society.*

The study lends weight to recent criticisms of the value of transparency (e.g. Dean, Strathern), and indicates the needs for greater attention to the role of secret knowledge and rumour in political debate.

### **3. Methods**

The project used a range of methods as outlined in the proposal:

3.1 Interviews with MPs, company employees, activists, development workers and government and financial institutions associated with the Ilusu Dam and BTC pipeline projects. In the original proposal it was envisaged that it would be possible to carry out approximately 60 interviews during the project. In practice, approximately 120 interviews were conducted, two-thirds of which were in Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

3.2 Computer generated maps of the networks of hyperlinks between NGOs, companies were generated by Richard Rogers and Noortje Marres (University of Amsterdam) using the issue-crawler software ([www.govcom.org](http://www.govcom.org)).

3.3 Field research in Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan. In the original proposal it was envisaged that it would be possible to make three field visits to the region (2 to Turkey and 1 to Azerbaijan). In practice, 5 visits were made (1 to Turkey, 1 to Azerbaijan and 3 to Georgia). This was possible because of good support from local BP management and staff, from British Embassies in the region, and from excellent research and translation support in all three countries. The project benefited considerably from the assistance and analysis provided by Prof Meltem Ahiska (Department of Sociology, Bosphorus University, Istanbul), Dr Feredah Hayet (a specialist in Azerbaijan based at the School of Oriental and African Studies), and from the British Council and Department of Sociology, Politics and Philosophy at the State University of Languages and Culture, Tbilisi, Georgia.

3.4 Observation and recording of events associated with the BTC pipeline project. During the project, the research observed a number of meetings including three public demonstrations in London (March 2003 - April 2004), annual meeting of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (March 2004), a BTC community investment workshop in Eastern Turkey, and various meetings between NGOs and affected communities in Georgia and Turkey (March-September 2004).

3.5 Feedback. Informal feedback meetings were held with key individuals (listed at the end of the report). These meetings provided the opportunity both to inform potential users and to test hypotheses and check data. Key informants in BP, government and NGOs have agreed to give critical feedback on further draft papers as they become available.

### **4. Results**

#### **4.1 Introduction:**

4.1.1 The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the Ilusu dam were both highly controversial. The Ilusu dam controversy ended, at least temporarily, following the publication of critical reports by both the Trade and Industry and the International Development Commons select committees and the subsequent decision of the contractor Balfour Beatty not to continue with the project. The controversy surrounding the construction of the BTC pipeline has been much wider and is on-going at the time of writing. It has centrally involved the oil multinational BP, two major International Financial Institutions (the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), a network of international and local NGOs, and the governments of Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, UK and USA. The BTC controversy became particularly intense during the second half of 2003, prior to the decision by IFIs to finance the project, and in the first half of 2004.

4.1.2 The Ilusu dam is part of the pre-history of the BTC controversy. First, an alliance between key 'anti-BTC' NGOs including UK Friends of the Earth and the Kurdish Human Rights Project, was established during the Ilusu dam controversy. Second, following parliamentary criticism of the Ilusu dam project UK government's Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) adopted 'Business principles' which subsequently figured in the BTC controversy.

4.1.3 However, there are also very clear contrasts between the two controversies.

a) The Ilusu dam project was characterized by both little information disclosure and limited assessment of social impacts in the first instance. In this case, Parliamentary select committees played a key role in bringing information into the public domain and asking critical questions concerning the negative social impact of the project. By contrast, in the case of BTC, there were unprecedented attempts at transparency for a project of this kind, in line with the World Bank's (1998) policies on public information disclosure.

In the case of BTC, the controversy took place primarily between the IFIs, BP, and a network of national and regional NGOs. The NGOs directed their attention particularly at what they alleged to be the failure of the project to adhere to the World Bank guidelines on environmental and social impacts and information disclosure.

b) Whereas UK parliamentary scrutiny in the Ilusu dam controversy was extensive and became critical to the resolution of the controversy, there has been very limited parliamentary discussion of BTC.

c) While the issues raised by the Ilusu dam controversy were well understood and the limited, the BTC controversy raised a whole series of different issues across three countries. Although the reasons for opposition to the Ilusu dam were clear (primarily the resettlement of Kurdish communities and the destruction of cultural heritage), different NGOs and governments had quite distinct concerns with the construction of BTC.

4.1.4 Although this research project was a comparative one, approximately 80% of research time was devoted to studying the BTC project, for the following reasons:

a) BTC was an on-going controversy and it was possible to study the controversy in process, rather than retrospectively;

b) BTC is regarded, by BP, the IFIs and the NGOs, as a key case for the principles of transparency and corporate social responsibility;

c) The BTC controversy has been much more extensive and has raised a much wider range of issues.

In these circumstances, the following discussion focuses on the results of the BTC study, contrasting them with the earlier case of the Ilusu dam study where relevant.

4.1.5 The case of the BTC pipeline appears paradoxical. On the one hand, when contrasted with the case of the Ilusu dam, the development of the project has been subject to a remarkable degree of assessment and monitoring and the BTC company have paid great attention to issues of social, human rights and environmental impacts. The financing and construction of the pipeline have been characterized by an unprecedented level of transparency. On the other hand, the project has been the object of extensive criticism by international NGOs and involved numerous local actions by affected communities, particularly in Georgia. The study indicates why the actions of BTC and the IFIs, although progressive in intention, have also provided the conditions for the development of what has been a highly polarized political conflict, both internationally and locally. One of the key findings of this study, with implications for both public policy and social theory, concerns the limitations of transparency as a political principle. In what follows I discuss the following key issues in turn: Transparency; Political Experts; Social Impact Assessment; Interested publics; Sovereignty and Accountability.

## **4.2 Transparency.**

4.2.1 Transparency is generally regarded as a good in itself. Transparency is expected to increase accountability and legitimacy, and to foster rational debate. The Ilusu dam project was heavily criticised by Parliament on the basis of its lack of transparency. While greater transparency is certainly to be welcomed, and the degree of transparency of the BTC project is remarkable, the results of this research project suggest a more complex picture.

4.2.2 In the case of BTC, all of the actors involved knew of, or imagined, the existence of practices, processes and events which were not in the public domain. For example, it was widely understood by political observers in the region that the Azeri and Georgian governments had established so-called NGOs to support the project, yet information regarding this was not made public. At the same time, some of those working for the BTC company or the IFIs explained away the actions of local activists by referring to their unacknowledged interests or the personal grudges of individuals. Paradoxically, transparency had the effect of reducing the credibility of institutions that performed it, since it was often known by knowledgeable observers that something significant was not being made public. In these circumstances, institutions that performed transparency, rightly or wrongly, appeared either complicit or naïve. In these circumstances, information which was made publicly available - by the IFIs, BTC and the NGOs - was not trusted. It was regarded often as part of a smokescreen that concealed another story.

4.2.3 The information made public through transparency frequently became an object of conflict rather than a solution to conflict. BTC and the IFIs produced public accounts which inadequately addressed the existence of problems such as corruption or a lack of cooperation from local authorities. Some of the reasons for this are discussed below. In these circumstances, it was possible for NGOs rightly or wrongly to find what they claim to be serious weaknesses in these public accounts. In practice the particular form of transparency fostered - by BTC, the IFIs and the NGOs - provided the conditions for an increasingly polarised and globalised debate, which has not been productive. There has been a basic lack of trust between the NGOs and the BTC company at a local and an international level: any information that is put into the public domain has been mistrusted by the other side. At the same time, even apparently minor local disputes between the company and affected communities became rapidly globalised through the internet - and addressed to the IFIs - due to the poor quality of effective channels of communication between the company and NGOs at a local or national level. Analysis of specific local disputes between affected communities and BTC suggest that

the IFIs may be poorly equipped to resolve such disputes at a distance.

### **4.3 Political experts.**

4.3.1 The importance of problems that cannot be made transparent gives rise to a further key finding. The BTC project involved extensive assessment and monitoring of social impacts by a variety of experts employed by the IFIs (principally the World Bank) and by BTC. However, along with these experts in social impacts, whose analyses were published, the IFIs, Western governments and BP also employ what can be termed political experts. Such political experts are primarily concerned with the actions and intentions of and the relations between governments, companies and international institutions and NGOs. However, the analyses of political experts are generally not published.

4.3.2 Within government, the oil company and the IFIs, the work of political and social experts are very clearly distinct. Social experts study affected communities; political experts study what is conventionally understood to be politics. Social expertise uses a series of standardised methods (focus groups, questionnaires, public consultation meetings) whereas political expertise relies on networks of contacts within and across key institutions. The distinction between social and political experts is a gendered one and marked by status differences: many specialists in social matters are women and local employees, whereas political experts are almost invariably men and from Western countries.

### **4.4 Social Impact Assessment**

4.4.1 While social impact assessment carried out in relation to the Ilusu dam project was limited and widely recognised as flawed when subject to public scrutiny, the research carried out on environmental and social impacts of BTC was extensive. Yet in the case of BTC, social impact assessment research was also heavily criticised by NGOs.

4.4.2 Knowledgeable observers argued that there were significant flaws in the assessment of social impacts by both the company and IFIs. Problems included too much detailed information on individual communities; lack of analysis of local and regional politics and forms of corruption; insufficient independence of the research from pressures from various interested parties; and an arbitrarily narrow corridor either side of the pipeline within which social impacts were assessed.

4.4.3 These limitations may reflect: lack of experience in the conduct of social research in BP; a concern, on the part of BP, to identify precise mitigation requirements for subcontractors; lack of recognition of the importance of independent research; lack of willingness publicly to confront problems of corruption in Azerbaijan and Georgia; and the tendency to focus narrowly on the particular requirements associated with World Bank guidelines. While the social impact research arguably did formally conform to guidelines, which are open to wide interpretations, it provided only limited insights into a range of problems that subsequently developed.

4.4.4 In contesting the social impact research conducted by the company and the IFIs, some campaigners associated with international NGOs cast themselves as experts in social impacts. They conducted short 'fact-finding missions' to visit affected communities and sought to show that the company and IFI accounts neither corresponded to reality, nor did the conduct of social impact assessment research conform to guidelines. However, observers potentially sympathetic to aspects of the NGO case found it difficult to use or trust NGO research. Claims made by international NGOs were viewed as exaggerated, opportunistic and backed by limited

evidence, thereby undermining the credibility of the NGO campaign as a whole, including the work of NGOs in the region. Despite the existence of a huge quantity of public information about the project, the debate over the development of BTC became increasingly polarised, antagonistic and unconstructive.

#### **4.5 Interested Publics: Consultation, Payments and Grievances**

4.5.1 In the case of the development of the Ilusu dam, the project was expected to be of benefit to Turkey as a whole, and there was very little concern with the rights and concerns of interested publics. By contrast, the BTC project did seek to consult and respond to the concerns of affected communities and wider stakeholders.

In broad terms interested publics were addressed in three ways: as stakeholders who should be consulted; as individuals and communities who needed to be compensated; and affected communities who could receive community investment or who had grievances.

4.5.2 Although consultation on BTC was extensive it was also problematic in two respects: a) there was a lack of any significant analysis of the conduct of local politics in the region; b) consultation was conducted during a period, prior to the construction of the pipeline, when the benefits of the pipeline to local communities were exaggerated by national governments. During the construction of the pipeline, and despite good work by BTC community liaison officers, there were few mechanisms through which affected communities could articulate collective concerns.

4.5.3 Two significant features of the BTC project are frequently cited by those involved in it as good examples of developing forms of good practice, and contrasted with earlier major projects such as the Ilusu dam. First, the level of payments made to governments, affected communities and individuals in the region was transparent. Secondly, BP funded a community investment programme. Both of these developments are, in principle, welcome. However, in practice, the ways in which affected communities were compensated became a key area of conflict. While there is a tendency amongst some of those involved in the project to view conflict simply as a product of the poverty of many of the affected communities, or the irresponsibility of NGO activists, these explanations are too simplistic.

4.5.4 BTC made distinctions between a variety of forms of payment to countries and affected communities. These include: transit fees; land compensation payments; good will gestures by subcontractors (intended to solve short term objections which may obstruct construction etc); the community investment programme (CIP) (intended to promote sustainable development); and various forms of payment authorised by senior management to specific communities and national governments. Given the complexity of the project and the range of different stakeholders, the existence of a variety of mechanisms of payment is inevitable. However, while these payments are distinct they are not necessarily experienced as such by those affected by the pipeline. For example, efforts by management to solve a local problem through a good-will gesture may have adverse effects on the CIP: a good-will gesture may encourage other villages to protest (in order to obtain similar benefits for themselves) rather than engage with the more cooperative relations expected by the NGOs involved in the CIP. Such difficulties reflect what might be confusion in company policy. For senior management, good-will gestures and the CIP both existed to assist the construction process. But for the NGOs involved in the CIP this was not necessarily the case.

4.5.5 Some participants in the project argued that the level of compensation payments were too high. In the context of poor and inconsistent land registration records, and high payments to

individual villagers, this generated significant levels of conflict within and between villages, and incentives for fraud. At the same time, compensation payments can be considered too low - in that they did not meet villagers' expectations that they should share in the wealth generated by the pipeline. Furthermore, villagers' expectations have both been fuelled by government hype and by the international NGO campaign. In this context, there were numerous local blockages of construction in Georgia. The international NGO campaign offered few constructive alternatives to current compensation practices.

4.5.6 An analysis of the controversy surrounding the construction of the BTC pipeline might be confined to a study of the relations between BP, the IFIs, national governments and NGOs. However, although they have not taken a public part in the controversy, the role of BTC subcontractors is also significant. A critical feature of the BTC controversy was the extent to which BP sought to demonstrate its commitment to the values of corporate social responsibility and transparency. In relation to these values, however, there are significant differences between the interests of BP and those of its subcontractors – differences which were underestimated by BP itself. Subcontractors are likely to be much less concerned with their public image and they do not have a long term relationship with local communities to secure. In broad terms it should be expected that subcontractors involved in construction will under-perform in social and environmental terms and, when confronted with local grievances, evade responsibility. In this context, the grievances of affected communities were inadequately addressed. Moreover, the IFIs were in a poor position to adjudicate local disputes.

#### **4.7 Sovereignty and Accountability**

4.7.1 A striking feature of the Ilusu dam debate was that parliamentary scrutiny was effective in leading to a resolution of a controversy. Against this background of inadequate public information or consultation about the project and widespread criticism, parliamentary committees were able to call the relevant government body (the Export Credit Guarantee Department) to account. The project was widely condemned as flawed and relevant recommendations were made to government.

4.7.2 The conduct of the BTC controversy reflected the lessons of the Ilusu dam as well as controversies surrounding earlier similar World Bank supported projects. The development of guidelines regarding social and human rights impacts, public information disclosure and consultation was expected to foster both greater public accountability and more rigorous scrutiny.

4.7.3 Although some governments played a significant role in backing the project, interested national governments (including the UK) lacked the resources to monitor the project or engage actively in the debate on social impacts in an informed way. In effect, they had to rely on the work of the IFIs and the company, both of whose expertise on social and cultural issues was underdeveloped. Moreover, national governments were marginalised by international NGOs who tended to talk directly to the IFIs even though these institutions were themselves considered interested in the project. In effect, local issues in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey became translated into global issues, thereby bypassing national institutions. In these circumstances, the UK government was relatively powerless in a debate that primarily took place between IFIs, NGOs and the company. In the absence or weakness of democratic institutions, affected communities found it difficult to articulate concerns and grievances, either individually or collectively.

#### **4.3 Theoretical Issues**

4.3.1 The study will contribute, in particular, to critical discussions of transparency, openness and public consultation in the sociology of science and technology (see submitted paper: 6.3). The study lends weight to recent criticisms of the value of transparency (Strathern, Dean) and indicates the importance of an understanding of the role of secrecy and rumour in the politics of technology. It shows that rather than providing the basis for a rational debate, transparency may instead heighten the value of secret knowledge.

4.3.2 In addition the study will make a significant contribution to the empirical study of three under-researched topics: a) politics and society in the South Caucasus; b) the operation of multinational oil companies; c) the development of practices of corporate social responsibility (see submitted paper 6.2). It will also contribute to broader analyses of the development of a market society in the post-socialist countries.

## 5. Activities

5.1 The project forms part of a network on ecological governance funded by the French CNRS, which draws together researchers from across Europe. Preliminary findings from the project have been presented at network meetings held at the École des Mines in Paris convened by Bruno Latour and Christelle Gramaglia, and will form part of comparative study of ecological governance to be published in Summer 2005.

5.2 The project is contributing to a collaborative research program on 'The Rules of the Markets' at the International Center for Advanced Studies (ICAS), New York University. The project is leading to a conference on 'Mixing Oil and Politics' convened jointly with Prof Timothy Mitchell (Politics, NYU) at ICAS in April 2005.

5.3 The project draw support from and contributed to the work of Noortje Marres and Richard Rogers of the University of Amsterdam (6.9, 6.27) and further collaboration with this group is envisaged.

## 6. Outputs

A major output from the project will be a monograph, currently in preparation. All outputs below are by Andrew Barry except when otherwise mentioned.

### Publications

#### Books:

6.1 *Transparency and secrecy: mixing oil and politics in the South Caucasus*, book ms in preparation, draft expected August 2005

#### Articles

6.2 'Ethical Capitalism' in W Larner and W Walters (eds) *Global Governmentality*, London: Sage, 195-211, 2004

6.3 'Public Knowledge and Demonstration: politics and the pipeline', submitted to *Social Studies of Science*

6.4 J Ewart-James, 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in UK Development Policy: policy and practice', submitted to *Development in Practice*

- 6.5 'Socio-technical zones', in preparation for special issue of *European Journal of Social Theory* on territories and borders, due May 2005

#### Reports

- 6.6 A Barry, *The social and human rights impacts of the BTC pipeline*, research paper DFID, 8pp, 2004

#### Seminars:

- 6.8 'Technology and Politics', British Council/Department of Politics, Philosophy and Sociology, Chevchevardze University, Tbilisi, Georgia, April 2004
- 6.9 N Marres and R Rogers, 'Following the Displacement of Politics on the Web', CSISP seminar, Goldsmiths College, June 2004
- 6.10 Public Knowledge and Demonstration: the politics of the pipeline', International Center for Advanced Studies, New York University, October 2004
- 6.11 'Social and Human Rights Impact Assessment and the Governance of Technology', ESRC Science in Society programme meeting, November 2004
- 6.12 'The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline', DFID, London, December 2004
- 6.13 'Feedback on BTC pipeline study', BP, London, January 2005

#### Forthcoming seminars:

- 6.14 Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge, March 2005
- 6.15 Department of Sociology, Columbia University, New York, April 2005
- 6.16 International Center for Advanced Studies, New York University, April 2005
- 6.17 Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, May 2005
- 6.18 Department of Geography, University of Durham, May 2005
- 6.19 School of Social Sciences, University of Cardiff, May 2005

#### Conference and workshop Papers

- 6.20 'Politicisation and Demonstration', colloque *Émergence des cosmopolitiques et de la pensée aménagiste*, Centre Culturel International de Cérisy-la-Salle, September 2003
- 6.21 'Technology and the Political Event', workshop on *Politics in Technological Societies* organised by the University of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, September 2003
- 6.22 'Oil, Water and Democracy', CNRS workshop on *ecological governance*, École des Mines, Paris, March 2004
- 6.23 'On Being Transparent', colloquium on *Social Property*, University of Cambridge, May 2004
- 6.24 'On Transparency: oil and democracy in Georgia and Azerbaijan', workshop on *Inside/Outside Markets*, École des Mines, Paris, June 2004
- 6.25 'On consultation', EASST/4S conference, 'Public Proofs: Science, Technology and Democracy', Paris, August 2004

#### Journalism and Broadcasting:

- 6.26 'The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline', *Open Radio*, Istanbul, 2005

#### Contributions to other research reports:

- 6.27 N Marres and R Rogers *Subsuming the Ground: How Local Realities of the Ferghana Valley, the Narmada Dams and the BTC Pipeline are put to use on the Web*, New York: Social Science Research Council, 2004.

Unpublished internal project papers:

- 6.28 J.Ewart-James *The Ilusu Dam Controversy*, 2004, 7pp  
6.29 M Ahiska, *The BTC pipeline in Turkey*, 2004, 7pp  
6.30 F Hayet, *The BTC pipeline in Azerbaijan*, 2004, 12pp

Forthcoming planned events:

- 6.31 Screening and discussion of documentary film about BTC pipeline in Azerbaijan, by Martin Skalsky, CEE Bankwatch

## 7. Impacts

7.1 During the period of the study the public debate over the construction of BTC was highly polarized. In these circumstances, any intervention in the public debate would have both jeopardized access to key institutions and would have drawn the study into making premature conclusions. Nonetheless, during the latter period of the study informal feedback was given to a number of key senior figures. This process was extremely valuable. On the one hand, it was possible to gain critical feedback on the research and to check data. On the other hand, senior figures were able openly to discuss criticisms in private which they would have found difficult to discuss in public. There was particular interest in the project in DFID. A private seminar was held at DFID in December 2004 (6.12) and a similar meeting was held with BP. DFID intend to facilitate further meetings with EBRD and I have also been asked to contribute to current discussions within the World Bank. As the intensity of the BTC controversy declines over the coming months I intend to draw on the results of the study to make more public interventions in current debates on corporate social responsibility and transparency.

Individual Informal Feedback:

Donald Maclaren of Maclaren, British Ambassador, Tbilisi, Georgia, October 2004  
Ed Johnson, Head of BTC, Tbilisi, Georgia, October 2004  
David Glendinning, Head of External Affairs, BTC, Tbilisi, Georgia, October 2004  
Rashid Khaldany, Head of Oil, Gas, Mining and Chemicals, International Finance, Corporation, World Bank, Washington DC, October 2004  
Mark White, Central Asia, South Caucasus and Moldova, Department for International Development, London, July-December 2004  
James Marriott, Platform, London, September 2004 and January 2005  
Elizabeth Wild, Manager, BTC Community Investment Programme, London, January 2005

7.2 Collaboration with the State University of Languages and Culture, University of Tbilisi, has led to an invitation to advise on the broader development of Sociology and Social Anthropology in Georgia.

## 8. Future Research Priorities

8.1 Short-term applied:

- Research on the conduct and quality of social impact assessment funded by private companies, IFIs and government.
- Research on the implementation of policies of corporate social responsibility in practice.
- Studies of the expertise and research of international NGOs

#### 8.2 Long-term:

- Anthropological and political studies of the South Caucasus.
- Theoretical and empirical studies of secrecy and the production and circulation of secret knowledge.

## Appendix

The following feedback was received on the research project after meetings with Department for International Development (December 2004) and BP (January 2005). The arguments presented in these meetings broadly followed the argument of this report.

12<sup>th</sup> December 2004

*"Despite the research being entirely independent of DFID, our regular interaction with Andrew Barry and Joanna Ewart-James as their research developed has proved an extremely useful addition to DFID's own embryonic policy position on these issues. The conclusions drawn to date and the strong evidence base underpinning them have been invaluable to us as our thinking continues to develop."*

Mark White  
Conflict Adviser  
Central Asia, South Caucasus and Moldova Section  
Europe and Central Asia Department

31<sup>st</sup> January 2005

*I found the discussion most stimulating and thank you for sharing it with us.*

*The Transparency ideas were new to me and of particular interest.*

*Good luck with the book-writing and please do make contact when you come up for air again!*

*Regards,*

Graham Baxter  
Vice President Corporate Responsibility  
BP