Concerns about the proliferation of biological weapons and the threat posed by bioterrorism have assumed greater political prominence in recent years. In response, governments are actively attempting to frustrate the diffusion of technologies, relevant to the production of biological weapons, to regimes and non-state actors which might develop and use such weapons. Their most recent efforts have involved the introduction of a range of new national measures to control access to materials, knowledge and technologies. The States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) have at their annual meetings during the intercessional period between the Fifth Review Conference and the Sixth Review Conference been seeking to 'discuss and promote common understanding and effective action' on some such national measures.
To do this, policy makers need information on the impact of new 'biosecurity' measures. However, this is a new area of polivy and few impact assessments have been performed. Our pilot project, funded by the ESRC, has developed and validated new methods for assessing the impact that UK government biosecurity policies are having on the practice of science. This Briefing Paper outlines the project and provides some initial results in order to assist the States Parties to the BTWC in their consideration in 2005 of codes of conduct for scientists and in 2006 at the BTWC Sixth Review Conference when States Parties will be considering further action to be taken on the five topics considered during the intercessional period. |