This pilot project aimed to develop methods for understanding the impact of new security policies on the practice of science in the UK. It examined the effects of legal measures, introduced since 2001, which seek to secure legitimate biological research performed in the UK from misuse in the production and development of biological weapons. 64, of an initial sample of 128 UK-based scientists, funders of science, biosafety officials and security officials were asked about their perceptions of biological weapons issues; the impact of these regulations; any positive or negative effects on their work; interactions with policy makers; and various possibilities to improve biosecurity.
Our research found that the new UK security measures do not seem to have had a major negative impact, which sharply contrasts with reports from the USA and Germany. However the majority of our sample had experienced changes to the operating procedures at their institutions. These changes included more rigorous risk assessment procedures, increased material safety requirements, and improved recording and regulation of possession and transfer of dangerous materials. These changes to operating procedures do not seem to have redirected science as 40% maintained that they had experienced no “major complications or setbacks” in their work and only 15% had moved into new areas of research and development as a result of the increased attention being given to bio-security. For those who did experience major complications, their biggest complaint was about the difficulties in obtaining pathogens and the changes now required to disposal of waste.
The research documented high levels of social responsibility within the scientific community and a willingness to consider all reasonable options to prevent misuse or misappropriation. This included increasing security checks on all personnel with access to dangerous pathogens; increased screening of new personnel; procedures to authorise and control off-site transfers; scrutiny by funding bodies when considering R&D proposals and scrutiny by scientific journals when papers are submitted for publication. The least popular method of control was denying access to nationals from countries of concern to dangerous pathogens, which conflicted with norms about the free movement of information and people irrespective of nationality.
Many of our participants also wished to increase levels of engagement with policymakers involved in crafting these security policies. They felt they could be better guardians of their science if they had a greater understanding of the types and risks of misuse, and of the logic underpinning regulatory measures.
This research has been well received by policy makers in the UK and abroad. Both researchers have briefed UK government officials on the specific and general views of our sample on the implementation of current security policies and future policy directions. International audiences have also been briefed as to the opinions of the UK scientists about future methods of securing science from misuse. Both of these types of briefings will continue over the next 12 months as new controls are discussed at both the national and international level.