Project design
This project was designed to produce an overview of UK export controls related to biological weapons. At the request of ESRC chemical weapons were deleted from the study upon confirmation of the acceptance of the award. In addition, at the request of ESRC a more explicit theoretical examination of export controls and their effectiveness was also requested. The project was neither designed as a comprehensive study of UK biological weapons export controls nor as a pilot study for a larger project. The project has, however, generated a number of additional research questions; indeed, it has perhaps generated more questions than answers.
Aims and Objectives
The aim of the project was to increase the level of understanding among academics, policy-makers and industry about export controls and the role of effectiveness of them in UK security strategy. Four questions were central to the research and the ultimate fulfilment of the aim of the study: (1) what is the role and function of export controls in the non-proliferation strategy of the UK; (2) how do export controls work in practice; (3) how effective are export controls in preventing the proliferation of biological weapons; and, (4) what is the future role of export controls in UK non-proliferation strategies.
The question of what actually constitutes ‘effectiveness’ formed the basis of the theoretical aspects of the project. In addition, question (4) developed into an exploration of technology management and governance using export controls as case within the wider biological disarmament regime.
Main research results
The new security environment which has placed increasing emphasis on the threat posed by terrorists and the potential of terrorists to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction has altered perceptions about export controls. While export controls have a long history they were tainted politically as being discriminatory to non-Western States – Western in this context being a political construct and not a geographic descriptor – involving a cartel on dual use technologies with applications to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
With the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter export controls became a requirement for all member states of the UN. Export controls were, and are, implicit in the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and an explicit import-export mechanism exists within the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Thus, despite the fact that for 30 years states parties to the BWC should have had export controls in place to fulfil their non-proliferation objectives, a UN Security Council resolution was required to mandate export controls and speaks volumes about the actual implementation of international and national obligations, i.e. compliance. Of course, the focus in this project is the UK, but the effectiveness of UK export controls cannot be judged without reference to the status of export controls of others.
In essence, Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) has internalized and internationalized export controls. The internationalization of export controls has (or will in due course) removed many of the political difficulties that surrounded their existence and application even within states parties to the same Convention. In addition, the emergence of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the growth in co-operative threat reduction activities under the Global Partnership, and activity by the World Customs Organization (WCO) have all impacted on import-export controls. The internalization of export controls to encompass national (internal) controls and accountability on the materials, equipment, technology, and knowledge subjected to licensing for export flows from concerns about the threat posed by non-state actors.
With the UK as a case study, the enactment of new legislation such as the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Export Control Act 2002 is evidence of the changing nature of export controls. The Quadripartite Committee of the House of Commons (bringing together the Committees on Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development, and Trade and Industry) on Strategic Export Controls is evidence of the internalization of export controls in one sense. In addition, it is evidence of the multi-departmental responsibility for the development and implementation of export controls in the UK. To date, evidence to the Quadripartite Committee from government and industry suggests that UK export controls, including under the new system instigated by the Export Control Act 2002, are working effectively. This is not to say there are neither problems in application nor known areas of weakness and continued concern. On balance, however, it is difficult to come to a conclusion that UK export controls are ineffective.
This claim brings into play what is actually meant by ‘effectiveness’ and at least half of the research on this project has been consideration of this question. Export controls have been used as a case study, but the search for a meaning to ‘effectiveness’ has gone beyond the more traditional security literature. As anticipated effectiveness tended to be open to interpretation, not least because failures in export control policy – be they actual proliferation that can be traced back to the UK or concerns over the burden of regulatory or licensing requirements – are easier to identify than successes. Moreover, effectiveness is somewhat subjective: in fact, with respect to export controls effectiveness is in the eye of the beholder. Metrics and criteria for export control effectiveness do exist – in the sense that others have attempted to, or have, devised such criteria –but the applicability of such criteria to all export controls and all states is open to question.
These three key themes, internalization of export controls, internationalization of export controls, and what constitutes effectiveness are the main outcomes of this research.
Academic achievements
The research has resulted in a more theoretical approach than originally anticipated and involved a more inter-disciplinary perspective covering law, science and technology studies, and environmental issues. The research will produce three main outputs, but in the course of the project discrete aspects of the work, such as that on governance and technology management, or effectiveness, have been explored and tested in discrete conference papers, working papers, and lectures. It would be incorrect to claim these papers as the principal outputs from the project, but they are related and listed in the full report.
Dissemination activities
Dissemination activities on discrete aspects have included participation in conferences and seminars in Budapest, Geneva, Oegstgeest, and Cambridge. Aside from the three published works to be completed in 2006 and early 2007, the streams of this research will be brought together in a paper at the ISA Conference in Chicago (2007), subject to acceptance by ISA in due course. Other, future, dissemination activities include the ESRC Genomics Policy and Research Forum conference on ‘Biosecurity & Genomics’ November 2006.
Potential impacts of research findings
With the three principal publications envisaged for 2006 and 2007 it is hoped that export controls might shift from being viewed only through the lens of security, to one that places less emphasis on the term ‘control’ and greater emphasis on the ideas of technology management and governance systems. Export controls cannot be effectively implemented by states alone. Other actors, individuals, industry, non-governmental organizations, regional organizations, and like-minded coalitions all play a very important role in determining whether or not export controls are effective. The principal publications are aimed at providing an overview of how export controls work, highlighting the dangers posed to export controls by interest in incapacitating chemical and biological weapons, and by exploring the question of what actually constitutes ‘effectiveness’.
