1. Background

After the events of 11 September 2003, countries around the world have had to reassess their security preparedness.  In relation to chemical and biological weapons, the immediate response in Western countries has been geared towards countering imminent dangers of established weapons.  However, as research in genetics and the life sciences proceeds, the threat is raised that new forms of bioengineered weapons could be produced that either augment or replace existing capabilities.  At the time of submitting the proposal, initial questions were being raised in international policy quarters whether security controls were needed on the conduct and communication of civilian research (e.g., Epstein 2001; Poste 2001).

2. Objectives

The principal objective of this small grant was to assess how individuals and organisations in the biological and medical sciences addressed the shared problem of responding to the growing societal concern with the proliferation of weapons-related expertise.  A number of more specific key questions underpinned it:

• How might current and future bioscience research facilitate the development of new forms of biological weapons? (4.1)

• What possibilities did bioscience researchers perceive in the development of genetic bioweapons? (4.2)

• How was “professionalism” defined, articulated, and negotiated in relation to the development of biological weapons? What implications did such considerations have for the communication of research? (4.2)

• What was the range of advocacy activities undertaken by professional organisations and individual scientists in the UK and elsewhere to alert experts and members of the public regarding the dangers of genetic weapons? (4.3)

3. Methods

The project employed three sets of methods during its three main fieldwork phases:

1. A technical survey of the major relevant trends in genetics through a PUB-MED search.  Based on the prior expertise of the grant holders, the review was limited to the relation between genetics and the fields of combinatorial chemistry, pathogenicity, nerve and endocrine receptors, and immune systems studies. The survey identified research into nerve system bioregulators in general and muscarinic receptors in particular as key areas for concern vis-à-vis future novel bioweapons.

2. A review the international proposals for the control of biological pathogens by drawing on secondary material such as conference reports, scientific articles, web pages, and professional association publications as well as eight telephone scoping interviews with key organisational representatives in the US.  Interviews were conducted with US organisations because this country has been on the forefront of debating and implementing bioresearch restrictions.  The key organisations and their representatives were identified through the review.

3. 28 semi-structured interviews were conducted with UK public, private and non-profit bioscience organisations as well as British researchers working in the field of brain muscarinic receptors.  The researchers were identified through a PUB-MED review of the scientific papers produced by British researchers over the last five years.  Those individuals from laboratories whose work was most closely associated with muscarinic receptors were contacted for interview.

4. Results

Section 4.1 -- How might current and future bioscience research facilitate the development of new forms of biological weapons?

With the complexity and breath of modern bioscience, it was clearly impossible to survey the complete range of genetics research relevant to bioweapons.  Since increasing attention is being given by those in security circles to well-known pathogens such as anthrax and smallpox, in this project we were concerned with less well-known agents which may present much more intransigent problems in the future. 

We identified the role of bioregulators -- chemicals produced by living organisms that have regulatory effects on life processes -- in the central nervous system (CNS) as a particular area of concern.  The CNS has long been a primary target of chemical and biological weapon programmes. The tremendous advances in neuroscience, linked to the whole biotechnology revolution, are providing the opportunity to make major strides in our understanding of the CNS, and thus in our ability to treat mental illnesses.

The scientific and medical literature review identified the role of brain neurotransmitters as an area of specific concern vis-à-vis the future development of biological weapons. More specifically still, current research into muscarinic acetylcholine receptors, endothelin receptors, substance P receptors,₂ adrenoreceptors and CCK receptors may enable selective agents to target brain receptors and thus the functioning of the CNS.  The prospect of producing weapons that are currently not possible to detect, highly novel in their effects, and presently untreatable is becoming increasingly realistic. 

In relation to muscarinic acetylcholine receptors, for instance, nerve agents developed in the early 20^th century such as tabun, sarin and VX functioned by inhibiting acetylcholinesterase.  Acetylcholine is normally broken down in the synaptic cleft by an enzyme called acetylcholinesterase.  Past nerve agents acted by inhibiting the function of acetylcholinesterase.  Since acetylcholine has a significant role in both the central and peripheral nervous systems, the net result is total disruption of their functioning.  In the search for treatments to neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer's and Parkinson's disease, major attempts have been made in recent decades to specify the functioning of acetylcholine and its receptors, such as muscarinic (M) receptors.  The latter have been found to be involved in motor control, temperature regulation, cardiovascular regulation and memory.  Recently the use of ‘knock-out’ mice and other techniques has enabled a greater understanding of the behavioural effects of eliminating the genes for individual M receptor sub-types.  In relation to bioweapons, such developments may enable both the more effective targeting of acetylcholine and the ability to achieve specific effects (e.g., incapacitation).

So along these lines, the M₂ receptor functions as an inhibitory autoreceptor, which makes any M₂ receptor antagonists potentially usefully in treating the cognitive deficits associated with a decline of acetylcholine system activity.  If the deficits of learning and memory in humans can be helped by the use of such M₂ receptor antagonists, however, the effects of M₂ agonists could be much less benign.

Likewise, numerous other developments in the study of M receptors could facilitate the identification and production of bioweapons, including:

* Highly selective M receptor agonist and antagonists are being found and forwarded as potential drug candidates;

* Combinatory libraries are being prepared for the rapid evaluation of M receptor agonists and antagonists;

* Alternative means are being developed to affect the signalling of receptors;

* The functioning of sub-receptor types are being linked to pathologies;

* Toxins are being tested as irreversible antagonists in vitro for M sub-receptor types.

With the pace of discovery in combinatorial chemistry, rational drug design, toxicogenomics and database mining, it seems unlikely that we are anywhere near the end of the road in these developments. 

The situation is particularly worrying because the US government has started evaluating the potential of incapacitating toxins, peptides, and cell signalling molecules to alter body temperature, mood and hormone release (Wheelis and Dando 2002).  Although there is no comprehensive understanding of such activities within the general public, as part of this programme drug classes such as benzodiazepines and ₂ adrenoreceptors receptor agonists have been evaluated as potential calmative agents (as in Lakoski et al. 2000). 

For a further analysis of potential threats related to bioregulators see Dando (2002; 2003).

Section 4.2 --  What possibilities did bioscience researchers perceive in the possible development of genetics bioweapons?  How was “professionalism” defined, articulated, and negotiated in relation to the development of biological weapons? What implications did such considerations have for the communication of research?

This project sought to develop an initial understanding of how British bioscientists conceived of the possible bioweapon implications of their work.  Based on the review described in Section 4.1, it was decided that we would focus our attention on those investigating the functioning of muscarinic receptors.  This provided a bounded and feasible population of researchers to approach.  In total, 16 interviews were conducted, 2 of which were pilots.  Prior to the interviews, interviewees were sent a one-page sheet outlining both past military interest in acetylcholine transmission and the key scientific trends identified by the grant holders during the scientific survey.  The interviews sought to determine how scientists defined the possible biological weapons applications of their research, where problems with research derived from, and what they thought should be done vis-à-vis possible regulatory controls. 

The 14 researchers interviewed reported little awareness regarding bioweapons or the potential relevance of their work in facilitating novel weaponry.  Only one had prior knowledge of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC), the major international agreement prohibiting bioweapons.  None were aware of the discussions set to take place under the BTWC in the next three years to establish new standards for the control of laboratory pathogens and for ethical scientific practice.  Moreover beyond the safety/security issues associated with dangerous laboratory materials, only three indicated ever having thought about the weapon applications of their research (two of whom because they had been approached by the US military).

This project took as one of its starting premises that classifications and categorisations of the ‘benign’ or ‘malign’ status of research would be contentious.  There are highly complicated and dilemmatic questions about whether some research is more ‘abusable’ than others.  While most of the scientists interviewed did not think additional controls were required, the reasons for this varied.  The rationales informed and depended on how various divisions were made between science and society, research and development, civil and military research as well as biodefence and bio-offence.  Therefore, following wider theoretical approaches in the sociology of science (e.g., Gieryn 1995), this project sought to consider the strategies whereby scientists framed the issues at stake and what these meant for notions of professional responsibility. 

A number of strategies were employed by the interviewed scientists to limit the scope of possible security concerns associated with their work.  Despite the interviewers raising current interest in Western militaries for novel forms of ‘incapacitating’ bioweapons, the scientists interviewed often reformulated concerns associated with bioweapons in terms of a terrorist threat.  As such, the problem of what applications research might be put to was discussed in terms of the use or abuse of research, wherein the moral standing of would-be ‘weaponiers’ could be easily established.  Expressed in this way, the important issues for consideration were ones of intent and purpose.  The potential for unwittingly contributing to the basis for new weapons through otherwise socially legitimate research or the potential development of ‘humanitarian’ incapacitating agents in the US were downplayed.  As an additional strategy for minimising professional concerns, many of the scientists interviewed also adopted a very limited range of expertise.  Despite all the researchers investigating the functioning of muscarinic receptors, many reported being unable to credibly comment on whether or what security controls might need to be in place, due to muscarinic receptors not being their principal research interest.  

Further by the way of prevalent interpretative strategies, those interviewed that said additional security controls on research would not be prudent most often justified this position by arguing such measures would comprise the open character of science.  Research was said to be guided by (Mertonian-like) norms of communalism and openness.  There was little acknowledgement of the negotiation surrounding what research is shared, when and on what terms because of commercialisation or competitiveness pressures (e.g., NAS 1997); or the practical difficulties of acting in accordance with the demands of idealised norms (e.g., as in Mulkay 1975). 

Not only should scientists’ conceptualisations of their responsibility be seen as a matter involving much interpretative work, but accounts of these were discursive in nature.  So, those interviewed gave multiple and conflicting accounts of the issues at stake.  For instance, while individuals at once distanced themselves from commenting on what security controls should be in place because of the said limited nature of their expertise, many of those same individuals also refuted the likely feasibility of controls through depicting scientific knowledge as collectively held within the community. Thus expertise and knowledge were multiply portrayed.  While it is possible for analysts to impose an explanation for such competing accounts (e.g., by drawing on professional interests or another ‘explanatory’ concept), in this project the extent of multiple and competing claims suggested accounts about the real character of science or what counts as expertise should be understood as contextually dependent and produced.

Similar interpretative strategies to those mentioned above also took place in wider scientific and policy discussions about bioweapons.  For instance, in the much publicised case of the artificial synthesis of poliovirus, the authors claimed that the possibility of synthesising viruses in this manner was obvious to all of those with the relevant specialised expertise (Cello and Wimmer 2003).  As such, the experiment did not reveal any information that would not be apparent to those with the necessary skills to produce bioweapons.  In other respects though the experiment was highly significant because it proved ‘proof of principle’ and served to inform society about future technical possibilities.  Any controls on research then would both not deter those determined and knowledgeable but would certainly serve to limit the public’s understanding of threats, constrain attempts to enact necessary responsive measures, and result in forgoing knowledge gained from experimentation. The attempt was made to have it both ways: simultaneously such experiments are deemed significant intellectual advances which merit publication despite possible contention but also insignificant achievements due to previous work in the area.  There are two dynamics at work here, one whereby facts get built up and another whereby attributions of responsibility are allocated (as in Latour 1987). The two acting together enable individual scientists to be portrayed at the same time as both players and pawns regarding the consequences of their research.

The prevalence of such interpretative strategies has important implications for thinking about possible research controls. For instance, it has been argued by prominent scientific organisational representatives and ethicists that technoscientific experts should have fairly limited conceptions of their responsibility; such as ensuring regulations are properly enforced and amended (Grunwald 2001; Wells 2003). What problems cannot be solved through these circumscribed measures are deemed society’s responsibility.  Examining the character of current debates about the biosciences and bioweapons challenges the possibility, let alone the wisdom, of ascribing limited duties through such neat demarcations.  In many respects, scientists themselves are the ones presented as capable of defining the nature of the problem with research.  As such, making judgements about the acceptability of particular research projects is largely presented as a ‘technical’ manner requiring the proper expertise to be able to comment on the issues at stake.  However, such characterisations fail to acknowledge the contextual basis of determinations of the necessity and the utility of research, the scope for multiple interpretations of its obviousness and novelty, and how some sort of justification can be offered for nearly any experiment. 

Section 4.3 -- What was the range of advocacy activities undertaken by professional organisations and individual scientists in the UK and elsewhere to alert experts and members of the public regarding the dangers of genetic weapons?

There are now active international deliberations about what needs to be done to reduce the possibility that bioresearch might facilitate the development of weaponry (see e.g., Zilinskas & Tucker 2002).  While much of the legislative and policy attention has focused on the physical access to known dangerous pathogens and toxins (e.g., FAC 2002), there also has been increasing debate regarding the desirability of controls on the conduct and communication of potentially ‘contentious’ research.  The latter has been central to the concerns of this project.  Herein, the social responsibilities of bioscientists are being debated across government and non-government agencies with a new found sense of urgency.  International organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross are seeking to strengthen international legal and normative regimes against biological warfare (ICRC 2003), the US National Academy of Science has formed high-level working groups to propose new research security regimes, and joint statements have been issued by UK and US professional organisations (e.g., Alberts & May 2002).

Yet despite general agreement about the abhorrence of biological weapons, just what should done vis-à-vis research controls is not a matter of unanimity.  Internationally, alternative assessments have been made regarding the proper vehicle for agreeing necessary measures.  The UK and many other governments regard the BTWC as the proper vehicle, whereas the US administration has adopted an increasingly vigorous and unilateral approach for ‘sensitive but unclassified’ research (Epstein 2003; Knezo 2003) outside of the BTWC.  This difference is compounded by others.  The US has embarked on a massive expansion of its biodefence programme and the grant holders have uncovered further details about its interest in so-called ‘non-lethal’ biological weapons (Wheelis & Dando 2003).

As opposed to the fairly elaborate debate about controls in the US, as of yet there is little joint, co-ordinated strategy across public and quasi-public UK regulatory and funding agencies regarding how to respond to potentially contentious research.  Given the argument of Section 4.1, this situation has obvious limitations.  The relatively stringent state of British health and safety biosafety provisions in place for the handling and protection of dangerous pathogens and toxins were stressed in the interviews and in general policy debates.  Biosafety regulation combined with the general system of peer review and evaluation was taken by many of those interviewed (typically those who were not previously dealing with bioweapon issues) as sufficient to address security threats.  However, the award holders have identified research conducted in the UK (Rappert 2003a) which is arguably strikingly similar to highly debated and criticised research relating to the now famous ‘mousepox’ project in Australia (Jackson et al. 2001).  While many UK officials are hardly unaware of the potential dangers associated with bioscience research, the existing provisions in place for health and safety protection do not respond to the full range of biosecurity concerns and arguably do not facilitate wider learning across public, private, and non-profit organisations.

Following on from this, there are also -- as of yet -- poorly addressed issues regarding how to communicate the dangers associated with bioscience research.  A key question is whether it is better to give approval and publicity to experiments that raise bioweapon possibilities in order to bring wider professional and public scrutiny to bear or whether it is better not to conduct such experiments.  While much of the public discussion by science policy makers and security organisations in the US and UK stresses the benefits of raising awareness so as to be able to invalidate call for security restrictions, as of yet this has been done on a limited basis for individual cases that have been brought to a wider public attention.  Should scientists in fields such as virology and immunology begin deliberately and actively pursuing lines of research with the purpose of raising awareness of their potential relevance for bioweapons, the sheer number of such possibilities would no doubt generate widespread political and public concern about the desirability of whole lines of bioresearch.

However tension ridden, there is growing agreement that ‘something needs to be done’ by way of alternative systems for governing research so as to address present and future bioweapon threats (New Scientist 2003).  The development of codes of conduct has been suggested as one key response. Despite general recognition in the UK and elsewhere of their potential (FCO 2002; Royal Society 2002; Atlas 2002), research conducted as part of this project would suggest that discussions about codes are still quite preliminary.

As part of responding to the existing state of affairs in the UK, the grant holders have suggested various measures (Rappert and Dando 2003 – Annex C).

Section 4.4 – Theoretical Implications

With its concern regarding the negotiation of boundaries and categorisations, this project has approached determinations made about the threats and (un)acceptability of bioweapons as products of political and historical negotiation about the legitimacy of forms of violence.  Following through this has had theoretical implications for how norms and controversial technologies should be studied.

Norms

Much of the current policy discussion about bioweapons is couched in terms of the need to reinforce the said existing, widely shared norm that these weapons are unacceptable. The research conducted here though would suggest that what any such ‘norm’ entails, how widely it is shared, and what it could or should mean for practical policy issues is far from straightforward.

In current security studies, norms are generally taken as collective standards for appropriate behaviour associated with, and in part defining, a sense of identity (Katzenstein 1996; Farrell 2002).  As such, norms are treated as standards that guide, govern, or otherwise cause certain forms of behaviour.  In contrast, following from sociological studies, the understanding developed as part of this project stresses the importance of treating norm invocation and adherence as practical and interactional accomplishments wherein both the meaning of norms and context are negotiated (Rappert submitted b).  In terms of methodology, this suggests that a rich appreciation of how norms are followed, reproduced or distanced from can be gained by studying norms-in-the-making in interactional scenarios, reasoning processes, or discursive encounters, rather than the current security studies preference for extracting out actions from varied settings to place them under a general norm explanatory schema (see Section 8).

Controversial Technologies

As this project has examined the potential risks with and responses to biological weaponry, it has considered the prospects associated with the development of various ‘non-lethal’ incapacitating agents and with the growth of biodefence research in the US.  In doing so it has examined the dynamics of the claims and counterclaims offered to support contentions about the acceptability of certain activities and what control regimes might be justified.  Conceptually then, just how interpretations of controversial technologies are advanced has been an underlying question requiring some reflection. 

Establishing a basis for international prohibition regimes for biological weapons requires cutting through the heterogeneous world in order to offer a characterisation of just what is taking place and why.  How definitions of the effects of technologies, the identity of users, or the contexts of use are interpreted and sustained in this process are key concerns.  As argued in Rappert (2003b submitted) while actors and analysts alike recognise the problems and dilemmas associated with offering acontextual and general categorisations that underlie arms and security control regimes, such claims must be offered nonetheless.  Attempts to offer prohibitions entail managing pervasive dilemmas with making general claims responsive to specific situations, splitting technology from its context, and offering convincing categorisations.  The research undertaken in this project suggests that when faced with fundamental difficulties and dilemmas associated with offering determinations of where unacceptability rests, actors and analysts alike engage in various strategies to deny, defer, deter, and deflect making definitive specifications about the issues at stake.  Alternative characterisations and definitions involve alternative ways of shifting the burden of proof for resolving the difficulties of substantiating claims about the acceptability of particular activities.

Section 4.5 – Policy Implications

Today the continuing developments in modern biology pose significant questions regarding how research might serve the hostile employment of biological agents.  Certainly the interviews conducted with practising scientists would suggest that an acknowledgement of this assessment is far from widespread.  Yet as well, all the available evidence suggests that it is very difficult to cause mass casualties with biological agents.  Whilst it may be possible decades into the future for some individuals or groups to threaten society with a mass casualty agent, it is not a likely possibility today.  From the perspective taken here, the current threat from biological weapons in general is limited.  However, that threat is likely to increase, both through the spread of technological capabilities and the development of greater technological capabilities.

Policy options therefore have to be chosen with that timeframe in mind. Whilst concentrating today on preventing illegal state programmes, we must also begin to put in place an integrated international approach more appropriate for dealing with the dispersed threat we almost certainly will face from the types of bioweapons considered here.  If strong, positive, integrated action is not taken in the years ahead, we could face a situation some decades hence (and maybe not too many hence) where many people will have the capabilities required to cause mayhem.  That response should include engaging in initiatives that will steadily enact, elaborate and reinforce a norm that the biotechnology revolution is not to be used for the production of weapons. This could include the incorporation of ethical codes (see Section 8) covering ‘contentious’ research as well as the education of students.

5. Activities

Selected Academic and Policy Presentations

Rappert, B. (2003) ‘Scientific Openness and Responsibility in UK Science Policy’ Foreign and Commonwealth Office seminar “Managing the Threat from Biological Weapons”  28 July London.

Rappert, B. (2003) ‘The Future of Incapacitating Agents’  ESRC Social Science Week Seminar at Arundel House on “Thinking about the Unthinkable”  26-27 June, London.

Rappert, B. (2003) ‘Toward an Understanding of the Abusability of Technology’ Saïd Business School, The University of Oxford  7 February and IGBiS, The University of Nottingham 14 February.

Rappert, B (2002) ‘The Governance of Biological Weapons’ European Association for the Study of Science and Technology University of York.

Dando, M. (2003)  ‘Scientific and Technological Changes and the Future of Biological Weapons’. Foreign and Commonwealth Office seminar “Managing the Threat from Biological Weapons” 28 July London.

Dando, M. (2003)  Panel discussant on future biological/chemical weapons for the Centre for the Study of Human Rights and International Committee of the Red Cross meeting at LSE 8 May, London.

Dando, M. (2003)  ‘Bioterrorism after September 11th.’  Presentation to the IFRI/Ministry of Defence/Ministry of Atomic Energy seminar on “Biotechologies, biological weapons and bioterrorism.”  9 April Paris.

Dando, M. (2003)  ‘The Future of Biochemical Weapons’ German Society for Microbiology Annual Meeting, Berlin, 23-26 March.

Dando, M. (2003) ‘Biotechnology and Future Biological Weapons’  Presentation to the   Society of Chemical Industry meeting on “Bioterrorism”  6 January, London.

Dando, M. (2002)  ‘Biochemical warfare’.  Presentation to the NAS Committee on Research  Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology on 9 September, Washington, D. C.

Wheelis, M. and Dando, M. (2002)  ‘Back to Bioweapons’  278th Pugwash Meeting 9-10 November, Geneva.

Dando, M. (2002)  ‘Bioterrorism and Biotechology’.  Presentation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.  16 November Istanbul.   

Participation in Science in Society Activities

The ‘Programme launch’ at the EASST conference (August 2002), the SiS debate at the Royal Society (12 November 2003), the ESRC European Workshop (15-16 January 2003), the ESRC conference ‘Democratic Governance of Technological Change in an Era of Globalisation’ (23-25 February 2003), and the ESRC Media Training Workshop (17 March 2003).

Media Outreach

Rappert and Dando were interviewed regarding the future of bioweapons for BBC Material World (21/11/2), BBC World Service (28/10/02 & 2/03/03), and BBC Northern Ireland (31/10/02).

6. Outputs

5 published written outputs (four peer reviewed) have been returned through Regard.  In addition, the following articles are under submission:

Rappert, B. (submitted a) ‘Controlling Evaluations’ Re-submitted to Social Studies of Science September 2003.

Rappert, B. (submitted b) ‘Constructive Norms’ Submitted to European Journal of International Relations July 2003.

See as well Dando, M. 2003. First CWC Review Conference Paper Bradford Review Paper. http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/

7. Impacts

This project has had an impact on and for users in a number of ways (see Section 8 as well):

- As indicated in Section 5, the grant holders have given a number of presentations at conferences sponsored by key defence and professional user organisations.  This includes: the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the German Society for Microbiology, the Society of Chemical Industry, the US National Academy of Sciences, Pugwash, and NATO.   

- On the basis of discussions undertaken with individuals at the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council, the grant holders were asked to prepare an exploratory brief regarding how the Council might respond to concerns about bioweapons (see Annex C).  This brief was subsequently also sent to the Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust. 

- Through both the user group meetings and the final project conference (held jointly with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – see Annex B), the grant holders were able to bring together diverse policy makers, academics and practitioners to discuss how to define and respond to possible threats associated with biological weapons.  This process itself has been instrumental in fostering new links and initiatives.  For instance, on the basis of a user group meeting, the British Medical Association will now host an international conference in 2004 regarding the investigation of suspicious outbreaks of infectious diseases that will complement and inform the UK government contribution to the 2004 discussions under the BTWC. 

8. Future Research Priorities

As indicated above, codes of conduct for bioscientists have been forwarded as a key means of addressing the types of future bioweapons threats examined in this project.  As such, the prospects, purposes, and possibilities for codes are matters of some practical importance.  Social science analysis of professional codes in general offer contrasting appraisals of their utility against varied objectives as well as whether they encourage or deflect social responsibility. 

The research conducted in this project would suggest the models of scientific practice underpinning code, scientists’ own conceptualisations of their actions and research context, and the negotiated relevancy of standards for conduct will be key areas of concern in adopting codes.  Questions for future research therefore might include: how are “norms” varyingly defined, articulated, and accomplished in relation to the control of biological weapons by those in national security, bioscience and social science communities?  How are the significance and relevance of norms about acceptable conduct negotiated in relation to characterisations of the nature of security threats and research practice?

Given the argument in Section 4.4 regarding the contrasting approaches to norms in security studies and the sociology, there is much practical and theoretical scope for not only examining the inter-relation and possible confliction of ‘security’ and ‘scientific’ norms, but also the inter-relation and possible confliction between constructivist security studies and sociological approaches to norms.

Following interactions by the grant holders with members of the Royal Society and Foreign Office, a project proposal relating to these themes was sent into the ESRC ‘New Security Challenges’ programme. 

Word Count: 5000

Annex A: References

Atlas, R. 2002. Written Testimony of the US House of Representative Committee on Science 10 October 2002.

Cello, C., Paul, A. & Wimmer, E. 2003. Synthesis of Poliovirus in the Absence of a Natural Template. Presented at Meeting on National Security and Research in the Life Sciences National Academies and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.) 9 January.

Dando, M. 2003. ‘Scientific and Technological Changes and the Future of the CWC’ Disarmament Forum 4:33-44.

Dando, M. 2003. First CWC Review Conference Paper Bradford Review Paper. http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/

Epstein, G. 2001 ‘Controlling Biological Warfare Threats’ Critical Reviews in Microbiology 27: 321-354.

Farrell, T. 2002. ‘Constructivist Security Studies’ International Studies Review 4(1): 60-62.

Foreign Affairs Committee. 2002. The Biological Weapons Green Paper London: HMSO.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2002. Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention London: HMSO.

Grunwald, A. 2001. ‘The Application of Ethics to Engineering the Engineer’s Moral Responsibility’ Science and Engineering Ethics 7: 415-28.

Jackson, R. Ramsay, A., Christensen, C., Beaton, S. Hall, D., & Ramshaw, I. (2001) Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox. Journal of Virology 75(3): 1205-1210.

Katzenstein, P. (ed.) 1996. The Culture of National Security New York: Columbia University Press.

Lakoski, J. M., Bosseau Murray, W. and Renny, J. M. 2000.  The Advantages and Limitations of Calmatives for Use as a Non-Lethal Technique. Applied Research Laboratory, College of Medicine, Pennsylvania State University.

Latour, B. 1987. Science in Action. Open University Press, Milton Keynes.

Mulkay, M. 1975. ‘Norms and Ideology in Science’ Social Science Information 15(4/5): 637-656.

National Academy of Science. 1997. Intellectual Property Rights and Research Tools in Molecular Biology (Washington, DC: National Academy Press).

New Scientist. 2003. 'For Whose Eyes Only' New Scientist 18 January: 3.

Poste, George. 2001. ‘A Rude Awakening to the Forces of Good and Evil’ Financial Times 27 November. 

Rappert, B. 2003.  Scientific Openness and Responsibility in UK Science Policy.  Presentation in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office seminar on ”Managing the threat from biological weapons: Science, society and secrecy.”  28 July, London.

Rappert, B. submitted a. ‘Controlling Evaluations’ Re-submitted to Social Studies of Science September 2003.

Rappert, B. and M. Dando. 2003. Exploratory Brief for the Advisory Group on Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council Response to Public Concerns: Reducing the Threat from Biological Weapons 10 January.

Royal Society. 2002. Response to Green Paper Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. London: Royal Society.

Wells, L. 2003. Policies and Prospects. Presented at Meeting on National Security and Research in the Life Sciences National Academies and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.) January 9.